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Abstract  
The focus of this article is Estonia’s post-socialist economic transition and the reasons 
behind the liberal nature of the country’s economic policies. I argue that the self-image of 
a nation plays a significant role in shaping its economic policies. Objectives associated 
with economic nationalism can be achieved through various means that can include 
strategies of economic liberalism as well. Thus, the concepts of economic nationalism and 
economic liberalism are not a dichotomy. I examine the construction of the Estonian self-
image through the discourses of radical individualism and industriousness, historical 
suffering, desire for freedom and return to Europe and sense of abandonment. By 
showing how these discourses interact with the liberal paradigm, I claim that Estonian 
policy-makers chose liberal economic policies because they perceived them to most 
effectively serve their objectives. When economic policies are examined in view of the 
national self-image and motivation of policy-makers, the incongruence between economic 
nationalism and liberal policies disappears. Keywords Economic nationalism · Liberalism · 
Post-socialist transition · Estonia · Baltic · Central and Eastern Europe  
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1. Introduction 
Economic nationalism is on the resurgence. Donald Trump, President of the United States 
recently declared that he is a ‘Tariff Man’ to whom national interests always come first. 
Brexit has dealt a blow to the liberal trend in global trade (The Economist 18.05.2019). 
Although Brexit has a strongly nationalist character, it is not a uniquely British phenomenon. 
Economic nationalism has gained strength in various European countries as well (Hopkin 
2017).  
 
Even though both Donald Trump’s policies and Brexit lead to the rise of trade barriers, 
economic nationalism does not have to mean protectionism. Traditionally, economic 
nationalism has been associated with protectionism and mercantilism that contradict liberal 
policies with their emphasis on free trade and a passive, non-interventionist state (Baughn 
and Yaprak, 1996; Nakano, 2004; Abbas, 2017). However, Shulman (2000), Helleiner (2002), 
Pickel (2003), Nakano (2004) and Johnson and Barnes (2015), and Reznikova, Panchenko 
and Bulatova (2018) all provide evidence that liberal policies can be compatible with 
economic nationalism. 
 
The argument of this article is that the self-image of a nation is a crucial determinant of 
economic policy decisions. It defines the objectives as well as the strategies chosen. 
Depending on the objectives and the national self-image of policy makers strategies of 
economic nationalism can also include liberal policies. By using policy formulation in Estonia 
as a case, I show how Estonian national self-image has shaped economic policymaking in 
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post-socialist Estonia leading to policies manifesting features of both economic nationalism 
and economic liberalism. I analyse the construction of Estonian self-image through a set of 
discourses: radical individualism and industriousness, historical suffering, desire for freedom 
and return to Europe, and sense of abandonment. By demonstrating how these discourses 
interact with the liberal paradigm I argue that Estonian policy formulators decided to pursue 
liberal policies because they perceived them to best serve their objectives of regaining and 
maintaining their sovereignty, breaking away from the geopolitical, economic and cultural 
influence of Russia, and reorienting their economy towards Western Europe. To Estonian 
policy makers liberal policies were a tool to achieve their objectives of building a prosperous 
sovereign state.  
 
The structure of the article is as follows. First, the concept of economic nationalism and its 
manifestations are discussed. Then an examination of the Estonian economy will be 
provided followed with a detailed analysis of the discourses of the Estonian self-image and a 
discussion of how policy formulators actualised these discourses when legitimating their 
pursuit of the liberal economic policies.  
 
2. Economic nationalism  
2.1 Are economic nationalism and economic liberalism mutually exclusive? 
The drivers of globalisation – the advancement and diffusion of technology, the 
internationalisation of production, consumption, input and output markets, harmonisation 
of economic policies, and standardisation of laws and regulations across borders - all have a 
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significant impact on national policies and behaviours. The complexity of the world 
economy, the interdependence of national and regional economies through the 
extraordinary integration of the supply chain make it practically impossible to decouple a 
nation’s economy from the global economy. Private capital through its locational decisions 
(i.e. where to invest) can considerably restrict governments in their policy choices. 
International financial and economic organisations have contributed to the homogenisation 
of economic policies with their policy recommendations (Pryke 2012; Crane 1998). 
Hobsbawm (1992, 191) argues that “nationalism is historically less important” and claims 
the “decline of the old nation-state as an operational entity” in view of the “new 
supranational restructuring of the globe”. In other words, globalisation and the integration 
of national economies have been eroding the impact of nationalism.   
 
It is nations through their representatives at various national and international institutions 
that shape economic globalisation. In today’s interdependent world locational qualities – tax 
regimes, the state of the infrastructure, the economic, political and legal environment, 
spending on health care and education – are all largely determined by decisions made at 
national governmental level. “As states compete for global capital, we see intense efforts to 
play up the distinctiveness of local characteristics and competitive advantages” (True 2005, 
202). Pryke (2012, 281) promotes the understanding of economic nationalism as a “set of 
practices designed to create, bolster and protect national economies in the context of world 
markets”. He distinguishes between “nationalist motivation of economic policy” and 
economic nationalism. Indeed, it would be political suicide for any politician not to dress up 
economic policies as in the ‘best interest of the nation’. As Hobsbawm (1992, 183) states, 
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“National economies… undermined by the transnational economy, coexist and intertwine 
with it”.  
 
To Baughn and Yaprak (1996), Capling (1997) and Berend (2000) economic nationalism is 
equivalent to protectionism as well as neomercantilism. Berend (2000, 317) defines it as 
“guaranteeing the command of native investors instead of foreign entrepreneurs, thwarting 
foreign competition in the domestic market by high protective tariffs and other isolationist 
measures…” In Hall’s (2005, 124) summation, economic nationalism mostly includes policies 
that liberal economists ‘disapprove’. Economic nationalism emphasises “the anarchic nature 
of international affairs” highlighting the central role of state-building and the “moral 
superiority of one’s own state over all other states” (Gilpin 2001, 14) contradicting liberal 
economic theory which underlines free trade and an economically passive, non-
interventionist state. According to Helleiner (2005, 308), liberal economists have referred to 
economic nationalism to “describe policies they did not like”. This narrative of economic 
nationalism contradicts liberal policies – the promotion of free mobility of inputs and 
outputs, and non-discriminatory access to resource and output markets, which involve the 
dismantling of all forms of trade barriers. Liberal theorists do not dwell on the concept of 
nation or nationalism but focus on the role of the self-motivated individual and the 
betterment of free society through proactive rational individual effort unhampered by 
government intervention. 
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As multidimensionality of the nation is a common theme in the literature on national 
identity (Crane 1998), it is not unreasonable to expect a broad range of policies adopted by 
economic nationalists, including liberal ones. Numerous economic liberals in the 19th 
century were nationalists claiming that liberal economic policies were in the best interest of 
the nation (Helleiner 2002).  Liberalism does not mean that the government should 
withdraw from all economic matters; as Hayek (1960, 194) argues, “it is the character rather 
than the volume of government activity that is important”. “The consistent liberal is not an 
anarchist” (Friedman 1962, 34) but intervention in economic affairs must be evaluated 
carefully on a case-by-case basis. Liberalism and economic nationalism do not constitute a 
dichotomy.  
 
There are numerous examples of economic policies bearing the hallmarks of both economic 
nationalism and liberalism. By examining the role of economic nationalism in the Japanese 
context of the ‘developmental state’ Hall (2005)  argues that economic nationalism needs to 
be defined not in terms of policies but in terms of its goals and motivations. True (2005) 
analyses the interdependence between economic nationalism and globalisation in the case 
of the radical economic reforms that took place in New Zealand. She brings up the creation 
of Brand New Zealand, the successful marketing of the Chinese gooseberry as the kiwifruit 
of New Zealand around the world, and New Zealand’s defence of the America’s Cup 
yachting race as examples of proactive nationalist policies promoting openness and 
liberalism. Both examples underline the need to study economic nationalism in view of the 
goals and motives of policymakers.   
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2.2 Economic nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
In the words of Timothy Frye (2010, 1) “(i)f the watchword of the communist era was 
conformity, the watchword of the post-communist world is diversity”. Post-communist 
transition has not followed the neoliberal model of linear transformation from centrally 
planned economy to free market economy but has gone ‘wild’ (Smith and Stenning 2006, 
205) resulting in diverse transformations with uncertain destinations (Orenstein 2001). The 
countries of CEE have witnessed the emergence of a variety of capitalisms. However, 
applying the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach to the transition countries of the CEE has 
been challenging due to the VoC debate’s focus on the highly developed economies. 
Regional variations of capitalism have been identified, such as ‘dependent market 
economies’, ‘patchwork capitalism’, or ‘hybrid capitalism’, which “describe the effect of 
changes but do not explain their causes or development in the wider sense” (Jasiecki 2018, 
338).  
 
The post-socialist reform packages devised for the countries of CEE in the early 1990s were 
largely undifferentiated with no regard to local conditions. These reform policies were 
based on the principles of the Washington Consensus, which rested on neoclassical 
competitive equilibrium models and on the four pillars of privatisation, stabilisation, 
liberalisation and internationalisation. Economic stabilisation meant the correction of 
imbalances in government budget, international payments and the money supply, and 
structural adjustment (Stenning, et al. 2010). To sum it up, post-communist transition 
mostly consisted of the “transplantation of Western institutions and “modernisation 
through integration” with the European Union” (Jasiecki 2018, 329).  
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Policy-makers and their advisors appeared to have an ideal outcome in mind, using phrases, 
such as ‘Western democracy’ and ‘open market economy’. However, despite the uniformity 
of policy advice, post-socialist economic transformations did not produce identical 
outcomes (Stenning et al. 2010, 39). On the one hand, the historical legacies of these 
countries “deserve attention as one of the important factors shaping developmental 
trajectories in post-socialist Eastern Europe” (Sokol 2001, 647-649). Berend (2007, 276) also 
emphasises the significance of “continuity and centuries-long legacies” and the diversity of 
“customs and values”, which state socialism inherited and which “became amalgamated 
into the socialist attitude and value systems under state socialism”. On the other hand, as 
Jasiecki (2018) points out, the impact of the global economic crisis and the different 
responses of the respective governments are likely to contribute further to the 
diversification of capitalism in the CEE. Globalisation and the integration of these countries 
with the European Union (EU) are two significant factors that have a major impact on the 
development of these economies. 
 
Despite the diversity of economic transitions and outcomes, the countries of the CEE until 
2010 were all moving in the direction of a market economy. However, recent developments, 
such as the electoral victory of populist far-right wing parties in Hungary and Poland, have 
underlined the revival of economic nationalism. In Hungary, the 2010 landslide victory of 
the right-wing Fidesz party with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at its helm represented a 
drastic shift in the political and economic arena. Hungary, “once the forerunner of 
democratic performance” (Lugosi 2018, 210) has made a “U-turn” (Kornai 2015, 34). Having 
won the subsequent elections in 2014 and 2018, Orbán has “entrenched his vision of an 
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illiberal democracy” (The Economist 05.04.2018). His economic policy – ‘Orbanomics’ – 
contains numerous illiberal elements, such as increasing state-ownership of enterprises in 
the banking, advertising, and transportation industries, and introducing ‘super taxes’ on 
finance, telecommunications, insurance and household energy, and nationalising the 
formerly private pillars of pension schemes (Kornai 2015). However, Orbanomics also 
includes liberal economic policies, such as the introduction of proportional personal income 
tax of 16 percent (Lugosi 2018). Johnson and Barnes (2018, 537) label Orbanomics as 
‘financial nationalism’, a “subset of economic nationalism that focuses on using monetary 
and fiscal policies as instruments to pursue a nationalist agenda”, which does not 
necessarily contradict economic liberalism. Indeed, Orbán has been happy to accept EU 
financial support and has been eager to keep the economy open to foreign investment, on 
which the Hungarian economy is heavily dependent (Götz et al. 2018, Financial Times 
22.11.2018).    
 
In Poland the nationalist Law and Justice Party (PiS) took office in 2015. Although Prime 
Minister Kaczynski has introduced illiberal reforms (The Economist 21.04.2018), the 
country’s economy is open to the inflow of trade and investment. Despite their illiberal 
rhetoric neither Hungary, nor Poland have “shaken the inflow of foreign capital” (Götz et al. 
2018, 168). Both countries provide examples of the compatibility of economic nationalism 
and liberal policies.  
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Estonian policy makers also pursued an agenda of economic nationalism. However, their 
economic instruments were openly and unambiguously liberal. As demonstrated in the 
following sections, Estonian policy makers have chosen liberal economic policies in order to 
accomplish national goals: strengthening national sovereignty and advancing economic 
development.  
 
3 Researching policy formulation in Estonia 
This article is an outcome of a research project aimed at uncovering the motives behind 
policy formulation in Estonia’s post-socialist economic transformation. In this research a 
qualitative, interpretive approach has been chosen due to the challenges presented by 
attempting to decouple individuals’ value systems and perception of reality. Through 
investigating the subjective realities of the respondents and presenting as well as 
interpreting the perspectives of their experiences (Creswell 2007), my aim has been deeper 
understanding of the causes and reasons of the policy choices of Estonia’s leaders. Although 
there is ample literature (Smith 2001; Feldmann and Sally 2002; Feldmann 2013, inter alia) 
discussing Estonia’s economic transformation, a critical qualitative evaluation of the motives 
behind the country’s neoliberal transformation has not taken place.  
 
In order to uncover the respondents’ beliefs, attitudes and motives, the primary data 
collection method in this study was semi-structured, face-to-face interviews. As the 
objective was to understand the motives of Estonian policy makers behind their policy 
decisions, participants have been selected by purposive sampling using specific criteria from 
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a hard-to-reach, specialised population. The interviewees can be characterised as political 
and economic elites, individuals who were either key decision makers, and/or had a major 
influence on policy choices of Estonia’s economic transition in the late 1980s and 1990s. The 
findings are based on twenty-three face-to-face, semi-structured interviews that took place 
in Tallinn, Tartu, London, Brussels and Riga between 2008 and 2015. The interviewees 
included every prime minister between 1991 and 1997, the President of the Estonian 
Central Bank who led the country’s monetary reform, members of the Central Bank’s 
Supervisory Board, economic and finance ministers, former dissidents and government 
advisors. A list of interviewees is attached in the appendix. The questions were based on 
thorough literature review, which enabled me to ask specific questions, to which the 
answers are not available in public. A well-informed interviewer is in a better position to 
check the accuracy of information received. The interviews lasted between one and a half 
and two and a half hours. The interviews were supplemented with alternative forms of data 
collection. Some of the best sources were the local media, such as daily newspapers. With 
two exceptions, all interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewees.  
 
Over thirty hours of recording has been transcribed and subsequently analysed with the aid 
of NVivo software, which proved useful to organise the interview content along the various 
themes that emerged and to locate information more easily. I did line-by-line coding, 
focusing on the emerging themes. The headings of the article are based on the main themes 
of the findings. In order to ensure trustworthiness of the findings, member checking, self-
critical reflection and triangulation were used. The information gained from the interviews 
was compared and contrasted with documentary evidence and databases of national and 
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international organisations, such as the Statistical Office of Estonia, the Central Bank of 
Estonia, the European Union, pre-accession reports prepared by the EU and country 
evaluations carried out by the IMF, World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).  
 
Data collection and analysis were carried out following ethical research guidelines. This has 
been an overt and independent research project. Interviews were held with the informed 
consent of the participants. The interviewees referred to in this article have given their 
informed consent to be recorded and identified.  
 
4 The Estonian economy: ultraliberal economic policies 
Estonia’s policies are markedly more liberal than of other transition economies. In 
Feldmann’s (2017, 33) words, the country is “commonly viewed as a prime example of a 
liberal market economy”. Firm belief in the virtues of the market, the supply-side 
orientation of economic policies, the minimalist and non-interventionist state are all a 
testament to the liberal nature of the Estonian economy. The current tax legislation, which 
is one of the most liberal tax systems in the world, places more emphasis on indirect, rather 
than direct taxation. All corporate reinvested profits are tax exempt. Personal income taxes 
are a flat rate of 20 percent (Estonian Investment Agency 2018). It has the most competitive 
economy in CEE (World Economic Forum 2018). In 2018, the country’s economy had the 
highest ranking (15) in the CEE on the Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation 
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2018). The OECD (2017, 10) praised the country’s “excellent business environment”, its 
successful integration into world trade, growth-oriented fiscal policies, “resilient” export 
performance and a public debt that is the lowest in the OECD. The organisation also 
highlighted inadequate social protection for the unemployed, low levels of unemployment 
benefits, and income inequality rates that are among the highest in the OECD. The response 
of the Estonian authorities to the recent economic crisis underlined the liberal nature of 
their policies. Despite the dramatic fall in GDP in 2008-09 and the sharp increase in 
unemployment, the administration implemented radical austerity measures. As the 
accession to the Eurozone was a strategic priority of the administration, currency 
devaluation was not considered (Feldmann 2017).  
 
The ultraliberal nature of Estonian economic policies was demonstrated by the country’s EU 
accession when international organisations, such as the World Bank and the EU, advised 
Estonia to ‘de-liberalise’ them. Estonia’s adjustment to the EU acquis communitaire meant 
the de-liberalisation of its economy through the adoption of regulatory measures (Adam et 
al. 2009), such as introduction of trade barriers and labour market regulations. Interviewee 
1 explained the process of de-liberalisation: 
“…when we started to negotiate joining EU suddenly we discovered that when 
we join EU, we should implement tariffs… Estonia is a unique country in the 
world. Joining the EU does not mean the growth of liberalisation of trade but 
the growth of protectionism against third countries.” 
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The country’s economic priorities reflect policy formulators’ national self-image, which has 
been shaped by the following discourses: radical individualism and industriousness, memory 
of historical suffering, desire for freedom and return to Europe, and sense of abandonment 
and self-reliance. These will be discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
5 Discourses of the Estonian self-image  
5.1 Radical individualism and industriousness  
In the words of Pickel (2003, 122), “(e)conomic nationalism is not so much about the 
economy as it is about the nation – the economic dimensions of specific nationalisms make 
sense only in the context of a particular national discourse…” Estonia’s post-socialist policy 
choices were mediated by their self-image, their views and memories of Estonian history 
and culture. In order to understand economic nationalism in a country, an examination of its 
specific context is essential.  
 
Defining national identity is no easy task. To Hobsbawm (1992, 8-9) ‘nation’ refers to “any 
sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 
‘nation’”, an evolving social entity. His definition of ‘nationalism’ relies on Gellner, meaning 
a “principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent”. Anderson 
(1991) defines nationalism as a ‘cultural artefact’, a socio-cultural concept, “an imagined 
political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. Nationality is 
a community, “conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (p. 6), an imagined fraternity, 
the roots of which lie in culture and for which people are willing to make serious sacrifices. 
Indeed, that imagined community may at times move people to “extraordinary political 
15 
 
action” (Crane 198, 55), as it manifested itself in the Baltic States in the late 1980s and early 
1990s where the liberalisation movements were deeply embedded in the reawakening of 
national identity (Surzhko-Harned 2010).  
 
The self-image of a nation has a clear influence over economic policies in post-socialist 
transition (Eichler 2005). In the words of the leading Estonian sociologist, Taagepera (1993, 
6), national culture is a “murky field of inquiry that has no easy answers, but some quality in 
Estonians has enabled them to survive and develop with an extremely small population…” 
Estonian policy formulators categorise the Estonian people as individualistic and self-reliant, 
which they use as justification for the ultra-liberal model that they have chosen. Estonia’s 
policy choices were more than a mere economic dilemma. The lenses through which policy 
makers viewed their options were shaped and chiselled by history and more specifically by 
their national struggle for survival.  
 
Geography played a significant role in the formation of the Estonian self-image. Estonians 
perceive themselves as Nordic of Finno-Ugric origins with close historical, cultural and 
economic links with Scandinavia reflecting European values of ‘civil society’ and a free-
market economic orientation, which has been reconstituted following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Lieven 1993, Smith 2001). Estonia’s self-image is firmly rooted in its millennia-
long relations with the Nordic countries, which left its imprint on architecture, culture and 
mentality (Piiramäe 1997). As Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas stated in March 2015 
“We are a Nordic country in terms of culture, in terms of mentality” (Financial Times 
02.03.2015). 
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Estonia is very scarcely populated; it is the second most sparsely populated country in 
Europe with an area of Denmark but only one-fifth of its population (Statistical Office of 
Estonia) leaving limited opportunities for socialisation. Their resilient and hard-working 
nature is coupled with egoism and a large dose of individualism (Lieven 1993) manifesting 
itself in their preference of technology over human contact. As Taagepera (2002, 254) puts 
it, “hope for technological-scientific solutions rather than cooperation with fellow humans 
naturally ties to the belief in hard but individual work”. As Interviewee 2 put it, they are a 
“relatively individualistic nation”. Their ‘radical individualism’ is illustrated in post-socialist 
Estonia in low levels of trade union membership. Despite the harsh social impact of liberal 
economic restructuring, Estonian trade unions have been very quiet, according to 
interviewees, contradicting the “simplistic” assumption that “the role played by the unions 
will mirror that of their western counterparts” (Herod 1998, 204). The same interviewee 
underlined the individualistic nature of Estonians that manifests itself in employer-
employee relations.  
“They are trying to negotiate with their employer their terms and contracts 
individually and handle their problems on their own... Estonians rely on 
individual negotiation and individual dispute resolution rather than collective 
actions.” 
Industrial relations in Estonia are decentralised with the lowest unionisation rates in CEE. 
Collective bargaining is rare. In 2009, the drastic austerity measures were introduced by the 
authorities without a social dialogue (Feldmann 2017).   
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Norkus (2007) points to the Pietist cultural legacy as an important determinant of Estonian 
policies of the late 1980s and 1990s. The Pietist ‘Herrnhuter’ or Moravian Brethren 
movement - with their firm belief in piousness, values of temperance, personal hygiene, 
choral singing, self-education and hard work - spread its missions to Estland and Livonia in 
the 18th century. Although all three Baltic Republics experienced ‘only’ five decades of 
Soviet rule, as opposed to seventy years in other parts of the USSR, Estonia’s economic 
performance surpassed those of Latvia and Lithuania. He goes as far as labelling Estonians 
‘Baltic Lombardians’ to signify their industrious nature. Miljan (1989) points to the work 
ethic of Lutheran Estonians as a cause of the relative affluence of the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ESSR) in the Soviet Union and contrasts it with the ‘anti-Protestant work 
ethic in Russia’, as the main obstacle to attempts championed by Mikhail Gorbachev, 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to reform the Soviet 
economy in the late 1980s. The Economist (06.01.2012) praised Estonia’s entrepreneurial 
record as the “best in the industrialised world”. Interviewee 4 discussed the value system of 
Estonians:   
“…Estonians throughout the history have been quite down to earth, quite 
realistic, stubborn, and even, which I don’t regard as a compliment necessarily, 
materialistic. Therefore, as it has always been, very important to Estonians to 
have safe, good home, why not a house, to have a car, etc. materialistic 
belongings, a good life.” 
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5.2 Memory of historical suffering  
The representation of one’s own nation victimised by other nations, which is a common 
theme across CEE (Verdery 1996), occupies a central place in the Estonian imaginary. Their 
‘memory of historical suffering’ is rooted in their nation’s and culture’s survival despite 
foreign domination for over seven hundred years, most of which were spent in serfdom 
(Feldman 2000). The survival of the small Estonian nation, its culture and language in spite 
of centuries of foreign rule has instilled a strong sense of national identity, as illustrated by 
Interviewee 3: “To be an Estonian is not just to belong to a certain nationality, it is a 
profession!” Lieven (1993, 18) cites Enn Soosaar, writer and political analyst to sum up the 
Estonian self-image:  
”For centuries, Balts have had only two choices: to survive as nations or to 
merge into larger nations. You could say that we decided, subconsciously but 
collectively, to survive. So for us, nationalism is a mode of existence… To 
survive, you must be nationalist.” 
The arguments that nation is not synonymous with country or state (Pickel 2005) and that 
national identity is not merely a representation of state interest (Crane 1998) are applicable 
to the case of Estonia, as present day Estonia had not taken its current shape until the early 
20th century either as a unified nation or a single territorial administrative unit. Despite their 
long presence in Estonia’s present territory, Estonia has been a ‘self-aware nation’ just over 
a hundred years. The country took its current territorial shape in February 1917 when the 
provisional government of Russia unified Estland and Northern Livonia into a single 
administrative unit in response to Estonian demands for increased autonomy. With the 
approval of the Estonian representative assembly, the Maapäev, the National Salvation 
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Committee proclaimed independence on February 24, 1918, whereby Estonia became an 
independent self-aware sovereign state. Up to 1918 there had never been an Estonian state; 
their national awareness was embodied in their constant struggle to nurture and foster the 
Estonian culture (Lieven 1993; Smith 2001). 
 
The prosperous years of the First Estonian Republic proved the nation’s ability to function as 
a modern European state, which had an instrumental role during the Soviet era in 
preserving Estonian culture (Lieven 1993; Taagepera 1993). The nation had an open 
economy with extensive investment and trade links with the West. Its speedy development 
was aided by foreign capital, mainly from the country’s largest trading partners, Britain and 
Germany. Economic development was fast; the country’s population enjoyed a relatively 
high level of well-being. By the end of the 1930s, Estonia had a well-developed 
infrastructure and a skilled industrial labour force with average earnings near Western 
European levels (Kahk and Tarvel 1997). Despite the authoritarian rule of the late 1930s, the 
First Republic is remembered as an era of political sovereignty and economic prosperity 
(Lieven 1993). It has enormous economic, political and social significance in Estonian 
consciousness, memories of which were kept alive in families throughout the Soviet era 
(Lauristin 1997). The ‘living memory’ of the First Republic is repeatedly referred to by 
Interviewees 1, 4 and 5 as a crucial factor in policy formulation, as it provided experience 
and self-confidence. The strong desire to ‘catch up with the West’ in the post-socialist era 
was significantly enhanced by the experience of the First Republic in the interwar era when 
life expectancy in Estonia was higher than in Finland (Vihalemm 1997).  
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The First Republic came to a sudden end when Soviet troops invaded in 1940. The 
independent Estonian Republic lost its sovereign statehood and became the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ESSR), an integral part of the Soviet Union (Lieven 1993; Smith 2001). 
During the Soviet era standards of living in Estonia were much below those of Western 
Europe. The Estonian population did not benefit from their higher than Soviet average 
productivity rates and efficient agricultural production because the central authorities were 
constantly increasing export quotas, which Estonian producers had no choice but to fulfil. In 
essence, Estonian farmers were feeding other Soviet republics (Miljan 1989). To sum up the 
damage done to the ESSR’s economy and the population’s standards of living, “the income 
and consumption level of the Estonian population had dropped to the level of the year 
1920; the living standards hardly ever reached the level of the late 1930s” (Kutsar and 
Trumm 1993, 130). If Estonia had been able to develop in a manner similar to Finland, its 
per capita output could have been four or five times its level at the turn of the 21st century 
(Klesment 2009) of €4,500 (Statistical Office of Estonia). The state of the Estonian economy 
in the early 1990s was dramatic; as Interviewee 5 recalled, “we saw how poor we are”, “we 
didn’t have anything”.  
 
5.3 Desire for freedom and ‘return to Europe’ 
Hale (2008, 2) frames ethnicity as a “powerful determinant of the strategies that people use 
to pursue the things that motivate them”, in order to maximise their “life chances" (62). He 
lists materialism, security, power, self-esteem and status as motives in ethnic group 
behaviour. He argues that the desire for national independence is strongly associated with 
long-run economic expectations. Indeed, as Interviewee 6 recalls, the overriding objective of 
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Estonian policy makers was “to increase living standards… I think a lot of it was just breaking 
from East to West… and moving towards Europe…”  
 
Khazanov (1995) points to the skewed Soviet economic development dominated by the 
Russian core as a major cause of economic nationalism in the former Soviet Union. Indeed, 
Soviet domination had a long-lasting adverse impact on its economy, polity, society and 
above all its national consciousness. Vihalemm (1997) argues that historically Estonia was 
able to survive and develop under foreign rule throughout the centuries until Soviet 
annexation because there was no mass immigration to Estonia from its occupiers. Soviet 
occupation changed that. Whereas on the eve of World War II 92 percent of the country’s 
population were ethnic Estonian, it decreased to 74.6 percent by 1959 and 61 percent by 
1988 (Khazanov 1995, 7). Taagepera (1993) argues that Russification of Estonia was close to 
the point of irreversibility. This view was echoed by Interviewee 3: “There are so few of us, 
we sometimes think that we are like the Mohicans!”  
 
Lenin regarded nationalism as a “by-product of capitalism that would become irrelevant as 
socialism developed” (Hale 2008, 96). The Party Programme of 1961 referred to the peoples 
of the Soviet Union as ‘united into one family’ (Shaw 1995). Khruschev spoke of a merger 
between the various peoples of the USSR ultimately leading to the emergence of homo 
sovieticus, the new Soviet citizen (Smith 2001). Soviet policy towards nationalities 
constituted the eradication of nationalistic and ethnic differences and the creation of a ‘new 
transcendent Soviet identity’, which Shaw (1995) describes as ‘federal colonialism’ and 
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Smith (2001) labels ‘ethno-territorial federalism’. The federal republics of the USSR enjoyed 
cultural autonomy, which meant the ability to use their vernacular languages in 
administration, education and culture (Shaw 1995; Smith 2001), and certain autonomy in 
hiring preferences leading to the prevalence of minority nationalities at republic level. 
However, power remained with the central authority in Moscow and the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, which was reflected in the popular slogan ‘nationalist in form, socialist 
in content’ (Khazanov 1995). The cultural and social policy of the USSR was aimed at the 
assimilation of nationalities, Balts included, by shifting their national identification to Soviet. 
Russians were the dominant nationality in the USSR; they were the most populous ethnic 
group and occupied the most important economic and political posts (Beissinger 2002; Hale 
2008). Russian language was promoted heavily squeezing out Estonian in public life and in 
the media. History was being rewritten to underline Estonia’s ‘close link’ with Russia (Shaw 
1995; Smith 2001). The objective of Soviet nationality policy was the “social, cultural, and 
linguistic unification of all nationalities in the USSR on the basis of Russian or, more 
accurately, Soviet-Russian culture”. The line in a once-popular Soviet song “(m)y address is 
not a house or a street, my address is the whole Soviet Union” sums up this policy 
(Khazanov 1995, 12 and 88).  
 
“If a state loses sovereignty, it has not survived as a state; if a society loses its identity, it has 
not survived as itself” (Wæver 1995, 405). The relocation of ethnic Russians served not only 
the purpose of meeting the demands of industrialisation for labour but also facilitated the 
assimilation of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the creation of a ‘Soviet urban 
proletariat’. The Soviet authorities distrusted non-Russian nationalities and regarded 
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Russians as the pioneers of socialism (Mettam and Williams 2001). The majority of the 
Soviet leadership were Russians, who encouraged the migration of Russians to non-Russian 
areas in order to “create or increase loyal and reliable groups of the population in these 
areas” (Khazanov 1995, 6). The loss of the country’s indigenous population followed by the 
repatriation of large numbers of workers from other parts of the USSR permanently altered 
Estonia’s ethnic scene (Kukk 1993). The onslaught of Soviet ideology and culture threatened 
the very survival of Estonian national identity. In Taagepera’s (1993, 68) view, the Soviet 
annexation of Estonia was nothing short of Estonia’s colonisation, an “unmitigated disaster”. 
Interviewee 7 labelled the Soviet era as a “huge distortion”.  
 
Fifty years of collectivist and paternalistic Soviet rule is construed as domination by an alien 
culture over a country of ‘European values’ (Kalmus and Vihalemm 2006). Estonia’s 
declaration of independence on 20 August, 1991, is not regarded as the birth of the Third 
Republic – the second one being the ESSR - or the Second (independent) Republic but 
signifies the end to Soviet power in Estonia and the restoration of the Estonian Republic 
along the ‘principle of legal continuity’. In effect, it is a restitution of the First Republic 
(Lieven, 1993). Holding Independence Day celebrations on February 24, the anniversary of 
the birth of sovereign Estonia in 1918, instead of August 20, which marked the declaration 
of independence from the USSR in 1991, underlines the continuity of the Estonian state and 
its strong links with the First Republic.  
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Freedom is a central theme of Estonia’s transition, as attested by many respondents. “The 
first goal was to become free and independent and the second very important issue was to 
live in a free country and free society” (Interviewee 5).  Under communism Estonians had 
neither economic nor political sovereignty (Lieven 1993; Taagepera 1993; Smith 2001). 
Interviewee 8 explains: 
“This idea of personal freedom and freedom for the nation, these were the 
most important things. Now when we take this idea of freedom, I guess in 
many cases for many people it was just carried over to economic freedom.” 
Interviewee 8 labelled the Soviet system as “feudal”, upon the collapse of which “people felt 
total freedom. You can see it even now in our society. Total freedom means that my freedom 
is not restricted by your freedom”. Soviet domination strengthened their desire of 
establishing a free-market economy based on the unrestricted ‘total freedom’ of the 
individual placing neoliberal theory in a favourable light. According to Interviewee 9, the 
paradigm to “take care of yourself… went to the extreme” and “at this time it was very 
popular to be very right wing”.  
 
“National sentiment became a form of anticommunism” (Verdery 1996, 82) and 
“anticommunism has an affinity for liberal reform” (Frye 2010, 50). Economic liberalism held 
immense appeal to Estonian policy makers, as expressed by this interview excerpt below:  
“There is also, some kind of a background feeling in Estonia that if I am going 
to be a protectionist, then I make myself as some outstanding fool. The main 
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line is liberal and now behave like that and I am not like some Frenchman who 
is fighting for government and statehood.” (Interviewee 1) 
Interviewee 7 explained the rationale behind their pursuit of liberal policies: 
“Friedman and such kind of freedom was very popular here. It is 
understandable because we had so regulated system for a long time, so 
regulated from Moscow. So we decided to go from this ‘very regulated’ to 
‘minimum regulated’… It was easier to chop this other world. Even such kind of 
half-regulated was, for us, too regulated.” 
 
To Estonian policy makers economic liberalism is a form of ethnic policy that reduces the 
geopolitical and economic uncertainties surrounding their nation and maximises the 
chances of their nation’s prosperity. Estonia’s ‘return to Europe’ progressed through ultra-
liberal policies, which were unparalleled among the transition countries, as clearly stated by 
Interviewee 4: 
“Usually, the IMF or World Bank seem very radical on reforms. Not for us. For 
us they were always too mild.”  
 
Whereas uncertainty is a “feature of all post-communist transformations” (Orenstein 2001, 
134), in Estonia it was significantly aggravated by the presence of Russian troops on 
Estonian soil until 1994 and the unpredictability of Russia’s policies jeopardising Estonia’s 
will to return to Europe. Although Russia was fast in its recognition of Baltic independence 
(Lieven 1993), Russian foreign policy quickly hardened, reminding some of a Russian version 
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of the Monroe Doctrine. The protection of the rights of Russians living in the former Soviet 
Union outside Russia became a popular tool in the hands of Russian politicians to build 
political capital (Khazanov 1995). The relative success of the extreme right in Russia’s 
parliamentary elections in December 1993 further exacerbated an already sensitive 
situation, in which Russian politicians, including Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, linked the 
issue of troop withdrawals to the condition of Russians living in Estonia (Raun 1994). In 
1994, Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev stated that “the countries of the CIS and the 
Baltics – this is a region where the vital interests of Russia are concentrated… We should not 
withdraw from those regions which have been the sphere of Russia’s interest for centuries” 
(Khazanov 1995, 87). In spring 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom the Financial 
Times (22.09.2014) labels the “most dangerous nationalist in Europe” called the collapse of 
the Soviet Union the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” in his state of 
the nation speech. He described it as a "real drama" which left millions of Russians outside 
the Russian Federation (BBC News).  
 
Woo-Cumings (2005) brings up security concerns, the threat of extinction to a nation, as 
powerful contributors to nationalist economic policies in the East-Asian context. Historical 
precedents and current political events have significantly amplified Estonian security 
concerns. Numerous interviewees highlight the manipulation of ethnic Russians by the 
Kremlin further enhancing Estonians’ sense of insecurity, which was aggravated by the ‘War 
of Monuments’ during 2004-2007 that peaked in the April 2007 riots following the 
relocation of the Bronze Soldier from Tallinn city centre to a cemetery. The subsequent 
cyber-attacks on Estonian government websites and the blockade of the Estonian embassy 
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in Moscow (Smith, 2008) where demonstrators waved placards with the slogan “Wanted 
the ambaSSador of eSStonia” (Judah 2014, 110) further intensified Estonian anxiety. 
According to a survey carried out by Levada Centre, a Moscow-based non-governmental 
research organisation, Russians regarded Estonia as the country ‘most unfriendly and hostile 
to Russia’ in 2007. In the second half of 2014, Estonia still ranked among the top 5 countries 
on the same list. Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014 significantly aggravated Estonian 
security concerns (Eesti Päevaleht 2014). In September 2014, Estonia’s Defence Minister 
questioned the credibility of Russia’s will to find a political solution to its conflict with 
Ukraine and called on EU and American leaders to increase the presence of NATO forces in 
Eastern Europe (Estonian Ministry of Defence).  
 
Estonia’s post-socialist economic policies underline Tsygankov’s (2005) findings that a strong 
sense of national identity may increase support for liberal policies. In Estonia it served as a 
strategy to move away from the Russian sphere. The will of “no way to return to the Soviet 
Union” and to “get as fast and as far away as possible” (Interviewee 10) led to a situation 
where “everybody wanted liberal policies” (Interviewee 11). Another respondent ironically 
summarised an apparently common Estonian perception of relations with Russia: “The 
relations with Russia cannot be improved unless we rejoin mother Russia” (Interviewee 4). 
Such sentiments add more pressure to the country’s post-socialist efforts to distance 
themselves from the Soviet past and Russia by joining international organisations, 
particularly the EU and NATO, and greatly contribute to their speedy implementation of 
reforms in order to quickly reorient the country’s economy from east to west. As 
Interviewee 4 explained, “we were enormously hurried”. 
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It is not a coincidence that independent Estonia pursued the policy of ‘bandwagoning’, 
which Lamoreaux and Galbreath (2008) call the joining of a small country with a strong 
nation or alliance in order to protect its sovereignty. Integration with the European Union 
served their economic and security interests. Fifty years of Soviet domination, which ended 
the country’s brief independence, made Estonians very sensitive to Russian policies. 
Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians alike consider Russia a very real threat to their 
sovereignty (Lamoreaux and Galbreath 2008) greatly enhancing their sense of insecurity. 
Similar to other countries in CEE, EU accession has economic as well as political and national 
security significance.  
 
History and the country’s ambivalent geopolitical situation instilled a collective memory of 
injustice in Estonians leading to a self-image of individualism and self-reliance. Half a 
century of Soviet totalitarian domination left them with strong anti-statist attitudes 
resenting dependence on a ‘nanny state’. Estonians proactively discarded the legacy of 
central planning in favour of a free market economy emphasising values compatible with 
liberalism, such as individual initiative, self-reliance, accountability, and a minimalistic state. 
 
Unlike in Poland, where the ultraliberal “big bang” reform (Sachs 1999, 48) lasted about one 
and a half years due to popular opposition caused by a sharp decline in the living standards 
of the majority of the population (Orenstein 2001), in Estonia the radical reforms of the 
successive administrations “enjoyed broad national consent” (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 
9). Estonia’s population was willing to make serious sacrifices and waited patiently for the 
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fruits of shock therapy to materialise providing the new administration with plenty of room 
to manoeuvre. People gave the new “government plenty of breathing space” (interviewee 
9), despite the costs of transformation from a paternalistic command economy to a free-
market, which were significant, as Interviewee 1 points it out: “I think, people sacrificed 
quite a lot in the standard of living… It gave room to the policymakers to make unpleasant 
decisions.” 
 
5.4 Sense of abandonment and self-reliance 
Estonia’s aspirations to sovereignty over their own affairs have withstood the indifference, 
and on occasions outright hostility, of the major geopolitical powers. For over seven 
hundred years they found their own destiny shaped by external forces, gradually forming a 
sense of abandonment and self-reliance. History has instilled a need to ‘go it alone’ in the 
Estonian self-image strengthening their resolve and awareness of abandonment and self-
dependency reflecting the neoliberal emphasis on the responsible individual. Their sense of 
abandonment was awakened by the ambivalent attitude of the western powers regarding 
Estonia’s status as an independent nation three times in one century in 1918, 1940 and 
1991. On all these occasions the major geopolitical powers ignored the will of the Estonian 
people (Piiramäe 1997).  
 
Although the Allied powers after World War I were in favour of self-determination, they 
were reluctant to recognise the independence of the Baltic states as they perceived the 
matter to be part of Russia‘s internal affairs. They only recognised Estonian and Latvian 
independence in 1921 (MacMillan 2001). Estonia found its interests overshadowed by the 
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West’s ‘Russia first’ policy in 1940 when Soviet invasion led to the incorporation of the Baltic 
States, including Estonia, into the USSR ending its sovereignty. Although “three member 
states of the League of Nations suddenly vanished from political existence and came under 
foreign occupation” (Lange 1994, 233), western concerns to maintain the anti-Nazi alliance 
with the Soviet Union during World War II and to preserve the status quo during the Cold 
War precluded any active support for the Baltic States, including Estonia (Lieven 1993; 
Piiramäe 1997; Smith 2001).  
 
This sense of abandonment and of being let down by the international community has fed a 
sense of the need to ‘go it alone’, an emotion that was to be resurrected again in the late 
1980s when Western leaders‘ main concern was to support Gorbachev. Estonian officials 
came to the realisation that the Western powers viewed Baltic aspirations for sovereignty as 
jeopardising Gorbachev’s reforms (Raun 1991; Lange 1994). Whereas according to Judt 
(2005) the West paid very little attention to the domestic affairs of the USSR, Beissinger 
(2002, 444) states that “until fall 1991, when the disintegration of the Soviet state became a 
fait accompli, Western leaders did everything in their power to keep the USSR from falling 
apart“. As late as summer 1991, George Bush Sr. in his “chicken Kiev“ speech (444) advised 
that “freedom is not the same as independence” (Khazanov 1995, 43). The cool western 
reaction to the Baltic independence movements was echoed by Interviewee 5: “Frankly 
speaking, not everybody in ’89 until ’91 supported our independence. Sometimes they were 
not looking at us very friendly.”  
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Estonian politicians consider Western reaction to the riots in Tallinn and the subsequent 
cyber-attacks on Estonian government websites in 2007 as lukewarm. Interviewee 3 
commented:   
“The events in April (2007)...  showed clearly that we don’t necessarily have the 
international support and understanding to the level we might expect... we 
were left out in the cold.” 
Estonia’s aspirations to sovereignty over their own affairs have withstood the indifference, 
and on occasions outright hostility, of the major powers. For over seven hundred years they 
found their own destiny shaped by external forces with their own agenda, gradually forming 
a sense of abandonment and self-reliance - values, which had a key role in the construction 
of economic policies.  
 
Notwithstanding Estonia’s Scandinavian ties and self-perceived Nordic identity, Estonian 
leaders did not emulate their economic policies. Interviewee 12 offered an explanation as to 
why the Scandinavian social-democratic system with its strong welfare state was not 
followed: “with Friedman as an apostle it became a bit ridiculous comparing ourselves with 
the Nordic countries and others”. Estonian policy makers emphasised the need for 
“minimum government regulation and control of business activity by the state”. As echoed 
by many interviewees, Scandinavia seemed “too socialist” with “awful” tax regimes, an 
“unaffordable” welfare system and “over-unionised” industries. Such narratives support 
Orenstein’s (2001) argument that potentially good policy alternatives were ignored in the 
transition of the CEE, as they lay outside the ideological range of policy makers.  
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The goal of Estonian leaders was the creation of an active society based on personal 
initiative, which overlaps with liberal notions of self-reliance and individual accountability. 
To them economic liberalism constitutes an effective strategy for securing their national 
interests.  
  
6 Conclusion  
Economic nationalism is contextual. It is a versatile strategy that can be used to push back 
against the forces of globalisation or work with them depending on what those in charge of 
policymaking deem the most effective method to achieve their national objective. The 
objectives and choice of economic policies are strongly affected by the national self-image 
of policymakers. Whereas in certain cases economic nationalism consists of illiberal 
elements, such as protectionism, in other cases it can include explicitly liberal policies, 
depending on the context and the objectives of policy makers. The national self-image is a 
crucial determinant of economic policy decisions.  
 
Economic models can approximate the outcomes of economic policies but they are of not 
much use when explaining the objectives of policy makers and their choice of economic 
policies. Economic models can explain the ‘how’ but not the ‘why’. Despite the uniformity of 
economic reform packages provided to the CEE in the era of post-socialist transition by 
Western financial and economic institutions, we are witnessing a startling diversity of 
outcomes. The role of national self-image in policy formulation and subsequently in 
economic development is crucial deserving further investigation.  
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Estonia’s economic trajectory provides strong evidence that economic nationalism and 
liberalism are not incompatible concepts. The country’s post-socialist transformation has 
been a sum of historical, social and cultural factors affected by the common experience of 
successful as well as unsuccessful efforts of gaining and preserving statehood. The Estonian 
self-image has been constructed through the discourses of radical individualism and 
industriousness, historical suffering, desire for freedom and return to Europe, and sense of 
abandonment. Estonian policy formulators proactively discarded the legacy of central 
planning in favour of a free market economy by emphasising liberal values, such as 
individual initiative, self-reliance, accountability, and a minimalistic state, that they claimed 
were the view of the good life that Estonians widely shared. In post-socialist Estonia, liberal 
policies form an integral part of economic nationalism.   
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Interviewee 1 Prof. Urmas Varblane 
Member of the Supervisory Board of the Bank of Estonia 
Interview in Tallinn, Estonia, 2008.  
Interviewee 2 Egle Käärats 
Deputy Secretary General on Labour Policy, Ministry of 
Social Affairs 
Interview in Tallinn, Estonia, 2011. 
Interviewee 3 Dr. Margus Laidre 
Represented the Republic of Estonia as Ambassador to 
Sweden, Germany and the UK, 1991-2014. 
Interview in London, UK, 2008. 
Interviewee 4 Mart Laar 
Prime Minister of Estonia 1992 - 1994 and 1999 – 2002 
Interview in Tallinn, Estonia, 2008. 
Interviewee 5 Tiit Vähi 
Prime Minister of Estonia 1990-1992 and 1995-1997 
Interview in Tallinn, Estonia, 2009.  
Interviewee 6 Dr. Ardo Hansson 
Lead Economist, World Bank 
Advisor to the Estonian government 1991 – 1997 
Telephone interview, 2008. 
Interviewee 7 Prof. Jaak Leiman 
Minister of Finance 1991-1992, 1996-1999 
Interview in Tallinn, Estonia, 2008. 
Interviewee 8 Prof. Enn Listra  
Member of the Supervisory Board of the Bank of Estonia 
President of the Eastern Economic Association 
Interview in Tallinn, Estonia, 2008. 
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